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 EXDIS - FOR AMBASSADOR ABRAHONWITZ  
 E.O. 12065: RDS 5/29/01 (BROWN, FRED D.)  
 TAGS: PPR, ASEAN, US, CH, CB, VM

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR SECRETARY'S TRAVEL

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING ARE DRAFT ISSUE PAPER ON KAMPUCHEA/VIETNAM  
 STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES/TALKING POINT PAPERS FOR BEIJING  
 AND MANILA STOPS. WOULD WELCOME ANY COMMENT BY DOB  
 WASHINGTON TIME JUNE 1.

3. STRATEGY ON KAMPUCHEA - BACKGROUND

VIETNAM'S INVASION OF KAMPUCHEA IN DECEMBER 1978 CREATED  
 A SITUATION OF UNRESOLVED TENSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WITH  
 GLOBAL OVERTONES. THE VIETNAMESE PRESENCE IN KAMPUCHEA  
 THREATENS THE SECURITY OF THAILAND, AND IS UNACCEPTABLE  
 TO ASEAN, CHINA, AND THE UNITED STATES. IT IS A PRINCIPAL  
 REASON FOR THE SINO-VIETNAMESE TENSIONS WHICH HAVE  
 ERUPTED IN PERIODIC BORDER CLASHES. THESE CLASHES, IN  
 TURN, HANDI CLAIMS WITH PROPAGANDISTIC IMPACT ARE EVIDENCE  
 OF THE "CHINESE THREAT" WHICH VIETNAM ASSERTS IS

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State Dept. review completed

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THE REASON FOR ITS PRESENCE IN KAMPUCHEA AND ITS INCREASINGLY CLOSE TIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION. A RESOLUTION OF THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AT LEAST NOMINALLY INDEPENDENT KHMER GOVERNMENT, WOULD BE THE CRUCIAL FIRST STEP, BUT ONLY THE FIRST STEP IN RESOLVING THE REGION'S TENSIONS. AN OVERALL SOLUTION TO THE TENSION IN THE REGION WOULD ALSO REQUIRE A MITIGATION IN SINO-VIETNAMESE HOSTILITY, AND A REDUCTION OF SOVIET ACCESS AND INFLUENCE IN VIETNAM.

ASEAN HAS TAKEN THE LEAD IN BRINGING FORCEFULLY TO WORLD ATTENTION THE THREAT FROM SOVIET-VIETNAMESE EXPANSIONISM. THAILAND, AS THE FRONTLINE STATE, HAS SET THE PACE. DESPITE DIFFERING VIEWS WITHIN ASEAN, ITS MEMBERS HAVE SUPPORTED THAI POSITIONS WHEN THE CHIPS WERE DOWN. INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA HAVE WORRIED THAT CLOSE THAI-ASEAN COOPERATION IN SUPPORTING THE KHMER RESISTANCE AND PRESSURING VIETNAM IGNORES CHINA'S PAST AND POTENTIAL DESIGNS ON THE AREA. INDONESIA, IN PARTICULAR, IS MORE INCLINED THAN ITS PARTNERS TO DEAL WITH VIETNAM IN A REGIONAL CONTEXT AND TO SEEK ACCOMMODATION WITH VIETNAM ON TERMS CLOSER TO THOSE SOUGHT BY VIETNAM, WHICH THAILAND BELIEVES WOULD JEOPARDIZE ITS NATIONAL SECURITY.

#### U.S. OBJECTIVES

U.S. OBJECTIVES CONCERNING KAMPUCHEA AND VIETNAM ARE THE FOLLOWING:

- A. STRENGTHENING OF ASEAN, AND PRESERVATION OF THAI SECURITY;
- B. WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE FORCES FROM KAMPUCHEA;
- C. KHMER SURVIVAL AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION;
- D. REDUCTION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE AND ELIMINATION OF SOVIET MILITARY ACCESS IN INDOCHINA.

#### U.S. POLICY

OUR POLICY HAS SOUGHT TO STRADDLE THE DILEMMAS AND CONTRADICTIONS INHERENT IN THE INDOCHINA SITUATION, TO TAKE

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INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF THAILAND, ASEAN, AND CHINA WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

THIS POLICY HAS BEEN ROOTED IN FIRM SUPPORT FOR THE ASEAN CONSENSUS AND VIGOROUS SUPPORT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ASEAN SPONSORED UNGA RESOLUTION ON KAMPUCHEA AS THE BEST BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT. THE RESOLUTION CALLS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA TO ACHIEVE WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE FORCES AND KHMER SELF-DETERMINATION.

-- WE SEEK NOW TO STRENGTHEN THE CONSENSUS BASED ON THE UNGA RESOLUTION, TO ISOLATE VIETNAM FURTHER POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY AND MAINTAIN THE VARIOUS PRESSURES ON HANOI. JUST AS WE CANNOT EXPECT THE KHMER RESISTANCE TO DRIVE THE VIETNAMESE MILITARILY FROM KAMPUCHEA, WE DO NOT EXPECT THAT ANY SINGLE COMPONENT OF THE PRESSURE WILL DO SO. RATHER IT IS THE COLLECTIVE PRESSURES OF AN INTRACTABLE INSURGENCY AGAINST THEIR CONTROL OF KAMPUCHEA; INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION; ECONOMIC DETERIORATION AT HOME; INABILITY TO INTEGRATE SOUTHERN VIETNAM INTO THE SRV POLITICAL, ECONOMIC OR SOCIAL SYSTEM; DEEP MALAISE AMONG THE VIETNAMESE POPULATION, INCLUDING PROFOUND DISSATISFACTION WITH THE POLICIES HANOI IS PURSUING; INCREASING SOVIET INFLUENCE, UNPOPULAR IN VIETNAM; AND THE CONTINUING THREAT PERCEIVED FROM CHINA; THESE PRESSURES IN THE AGGREGATE MAY LEAD HANOI TO COMPROMISE ON KAMPUCHEA. IN THE CONTEXT OF MOVEMENT TOWARD A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION BASED ROUGHLY ON THE UNGA RESOLUTION, SINO-VIETNAMESE TENSIONS COULD BE REDUCED AND HANOI'S RELATIONS WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD PROGRESSIVELY NORMALIZED. IN THAT CONTEXT, WE WOULD EXPECT TO WORK SUCCESSFULLY TO REDUCE SOVIET MILITARY ACCESS AND LESSEN SOVIET INFLUENCE IN VIETNAM.

-- OUR POLICY HAS ALSO SOUGHT TO ENSURE THE SURVIVAL OF THE KHMER, AND WE HAVE SUPPORTED URGENTLY HUMANITARIAN RELIEF FOR THE KHMER.

-- WE HAVE ALSO ATTEMPTED TO SENSITIZE THE ASEANS MORE FULLY TO THE DIMENSIONS OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET-VIETNAMESE ALLIANCE

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IN THAT CONNECTION.

-- WE HAVE ENCOURAGED CHINA TO PHASE OUT ITS SUPPORT FOR THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCIES IN THE ASEAN STATES (THAILAND AND MALAYSIA AND BURMA AND TO CULTIVATE BETTER STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS. THE REPORTED CHINESE DECISION TO CLOSE THE CLANDESTINE MALAYSIAN COMMUNIST RADIO, PRECEDED BY CLOSURE OF THE THAI COMMUNIST STATION AND VIRTUAL CESSATION OF DIRECT CHINESE MATERIAL SUPPORT, ARE MAJOR STEPS FORWARD IN THIS REGARD.

AS FURTHER SPECIFIC MEASURES, WE HAVE:

-- INDICATED TO FRIENDS THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE ASEAN STRATEGY IN THE UNITED NATIONS, INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR THE DK CREDENTIALS IN THE UNGA. THIS LATTER POSITION KEEPS PRESSURE ON THE VIETNAMESE AND MAINTAINS THE LEGITIMACY OF THE KHMER RESISTANCE.

-- WE HAVE HEIGHTENED OUR MORAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE KHMER NATIONALISTS RALLYING AGAINST VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA. THIS EFFORT INCLUDED WELCOMING KHMER PEOPLE'S NATIONALIST LIBERATION FRONT LEADER, SON SANN, TO WASHINGTON. WE HAVE URGED THE NATIONALISTS TO UNITE, BUT HAVE NOT PRESSURED THEM TO JOIN A COALITION WITH THE KHMER ROUGE UNLESS, IN THEIR JUDGEMENT, THEIR OWN CONDITIONS AND TERMS ARE MET.

-- WE PROMISED SON SANN TO LOOK INTO POSSIBILITIES FOR AN INCREASE OF HUMANITARIAN AID TO HIS VILLAGERS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELIEF PROGRAM, AND ARE DOING SO. WE MADE NO COMMITMENTS ON HIS REQUESTS FOR FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT, BUT WE WILL WATCH CLOSELY THE EFFORTS TO UNITE THE KHMER AND THE ATTITUDE OF OUR FRIENDS, PARTICULARLY ASEAN, TOWARD SUCH DEVELOPMENTS. CREATION OF UNITED FRONT OR COALITION WOULD LEAD US TO REVIEW POSSIBLE WAYS TO HELP, BUT WE HAVE MADE NO COMMITMENTS TO ANYONE ON SUCH AID.

-- WE HAVE EXAMINED MEANS TO TIGHTEN THE ECONOMIC PRES-

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SURES ON VIETNAM, AND ITS ACCESS TO THE UN SYSTEM AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. WE HAVE CONSULTED WITH ASEAN AND OTHER FRIENDS TO PURSUE, AS APPROPRIATE, THE RESULTS OF THESE STUDIES.

-- WE HAVE THUS FAR ACCEPTED A TACIT DIVISION OF LABOR CONCERNING THE KHMER RESISTANCE, ACQUIESCING IN CHINESE AND THAI SUPPLY OF WEAPONS AND OTHER MATERIAL SUPPORT TO THE DK AND KPNLF, WHILE WE CONCENTRATED ON DIPLOMATIC, POLITICAL AND MORAL SUPPORT FOR THE ASEAN STRATEGY AND THE KHMER NATIONALISTS. WE WOULD NOT CONTEMPLATE COMMITMENTS TO GO BEYOND THIS STANCE DURING THE VISITS TO BEIJING, ASEAN AND ANZUS.

## STRATEGY

OUR OBJECTIVE CONCERNING KAMPUCHEA/VIETNAM DURING THE CURRENT TRIP TO BEIJING, MANILA AND WELLINGTON WILL BE TO STRENGTHEN THE CONSENSUS SUPPORTING THE ASEAN STRATEGY. THIS WILL INVOLVE NURTURING THE IMAGE OF STRONG AND SUBSTANTIAL AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE STRATEGY, BOTH AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE AND OUT OF COMMON STRATEGIC INTERESTS, SHARED IN THIS CONTEXT WITH BEIJING, ASEAN AND ANZUS.

IN BEIJING, WE SHOULD COMMENT POSITIVELY ON OUR SHARED STRATEGIC PERCEPTIONS AND RAISE THE ISSUES OF THE PRESENT DK LEADERSHIP, IN CONNECTION WITH MAXIMIZING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE STRATEGY, AND CHINESE SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. IN RESPONSE TO PROBABLE CHINESE ENCOURAGEMENT OF U.S. MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR KHMER RESISTANCE, WE WOULD DEFER OUR DECISION AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER CONSULTING CLOSELY WITH ASEAN. WITH ASEAN, WE WILL WISH TO WORK TO STRENGTHEN THE CONSENSUS, ESPECIALLY WITH WAVEPERS FROM INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA, AND DISCUSS PRIVATELY INDIVIDUAL ASEAN COUNTRIES' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE KHMER RESISTANCE. WITH ANZUS, YOUR VOICE SHOULD BE ADDED TO THOSE SEEKING TO REVERSE AUSTRALIA'S POSITION OF ABSTAINING ON DK CREDENTIALS.

OBJECTIVES AND TALKING POINTS ON KAMPUCHEA TAILORED TO THE THREE STOPS ARE INCLUDED IN THE CONSOLIDATED TALKING

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POINTS.

4. OBJECTIVE/TALKING POINTS (ASEAN)

OBJECTIVE: COORDINATE STRATEGY ON VIETNAM/KAMPUCHEA WITH ASEAN, AND CONVINCE ASEAN OF THE RELIABILITY OF OUR SUPPORT.

WE HAVE CONSULTED CLOSELY WITH ASEAN OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS ON THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA. IN GENERAL, ASEAN HAS TAKEN THE LEAD ON THIS ISSUE, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE WELCOMED OUR IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS. WE SHOULD AFFIRM OUR DURABLE SUPPORT FOR THE UNGA RESOLUTION, AND FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA FOR WHICH IT CALLS. WE WISH TO CONSULT MORE CLOSELY WITH ASEAN TO INTENSIFY THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISOLATION OF VIETNAM, INCLUDING BRINGING, AS APPROPRIATE, INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM FROM THE UN SYSTEM AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

WE SHOULD CONFIRM OUR MORAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE RALLYING OF KHMER NATIONALISTS IN OPPOSITION TO THE VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION. THE ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS DECIDED IN JAKARTA MAY 8-9 TO AVOID ANY COMMITMENT BY ASEAN AS AN ORGANIZATION TO THE KHMER RESISTANCE. AS INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES, HOWEVER, THAILAND AND SINGAPORE PARTICULARLY ARE INTERESTED IN EARLY FORMATION OF A UNITED KHMER RESISTANCE.

TALKING POINTS

-- VIETNAM'S OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA IS THE MANIFESTATION OF HANOI'S REGIONAL AMBITIONS AND OF THE JOINT EFFORTS OF THE SOVIETS AND VIETNAMESE TO PROJECT THEIR INFLUENCE AND DOMINATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA;

-- THE UNITED STATES IS UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO THIS AGGRESSION, AND WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH ASEAN AND OTHER FRIENDLY POWERS TO HEIGHTEN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON VIETNAM TO GET HANOI TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT IN

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KAMPUCHEA. OUR SUPPORT FOR ASEAN'S STRATEGY IS DURABLE. WE WISH TO WORK WITH ASEAN TO IDENTIFY MEANS TO INTENSIFY THE PRESSURE ON VIETNAM. WE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT ASEAN'S STRATEGY IN THE UN, INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR DK CREDENTIALS.

-- WE WOULD PREFER A CONSTRUCTIVE COURSE FOR THE REGION; PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT AND STABILITY ARE CURRENTLY JEOPARDIZED BY VIETNAMESE AMBITIONS AND OBSTINACY;

-- THE ASEAN SPONSORED UNGA RESOLUTION ON KAMPUCHEA, WHICH THE UNITED STATES FIRMLY SUPPORTS, OFFERS THE BEST PRINCIPLES ON WHICH A CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION COULD BE DEVELOPED.

-- THE UNITED STATES FIRMLY ENDORSES THE HOLDING OF A CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA, AND WE ARE URGING OTHER PARTIES TO ATTEND AS THE NEXT STEP FORWARD SEEKING A SOLUTION FOR KAMPUCHEA;

WE ALSO WELCOME THE EFFORTS OF KHMER NATIONALISTS TO RAISELY SUPPORT IN OPPOSITION TO THE VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA. WE ARE PROVIDING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. THEY HAVE OUR MORAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT. WE WILL WATCH CLOSELY THE EVOLUTION OF THESE EFFORTS, TO DETERMINE, WORKING CLOSELY WITH ASEAN, WHAT ROLE WE CAN PLAY BEST.

##### 5. OBJECTIVES/TALKING POINTS (CHINA)

OBJECTIVE: TO STRENGTHEN COOPERATION ON KAMPUCHEA/VIETNAM STRATEGY. KAMPUCHEA SYMBOLIZES OUR STRATEGIC ENTENTE WITH CHINA IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT, AND OUR COMMON OPPOSITION TO ALLIED SOVIET/VIETNAMESE EFFORTS TO EXTEND THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE REGION.

WE SHOULD ATTEMPT SUBTLY TO EDGE CHINA EVEN CLOSER TO THE ASEAN CONSENSUS. IN RESPONSE TO PROBABLE CHINESE ENCOURAGEMENT OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR KHMER RESISTANCE, YOU SHOULD MAKE NO COMMITMENT TO MATERIAL AID UNTIL THE FORM AND QUALITY OF THE KHMER RESISTANCE IS CLARIFIED AND

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WE HAVE CONFERRED CLOSELY WITH ASEAN. YOU SHOULD RAISE THE SENSITIVE SUBJECT OF THE POL POT LEADERSHIP IN THE CONTEXT OF MAXIMIZING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT OPPOSING THE VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION AND IN TERMS OF GENERAL AGREEMENT, INCLUDING CHINA'S, THAT THE KHMER THEMSELVES SHOULD CHOOSE THEIR OWN LEADERSHIP. ASEAN LEADERS WILL BE KEENLY INTERESTED IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH CHINESE LEADERS ON THE DK AND CHINESE SUPPORT FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN INSURGENCIES.

## TALKING POINTS

-- COMMENT WITH PLEASURE ON THE SHARED STRATEGIC PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES AND NOTE PARTICULARLY THAT KAMPUCHEA SYMBOLIZES IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT OUR STRATEGIC ENTENTE WITH CHINA.

-- WE APPRECIATE THE KEY POLITICAL AND MILITARY ROLE CHINA PLAYS IN THE COMMON STRATEGY OPPOSING ALLIED SOVIET AND VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION AND EFFORTS TO EXTEND THEIR INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

-- WE INTEND TO CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH CHINA, ASEAN, JAPAN, AND OTHER FRIENDS TO INTENSIFY THE CHALLENGE TO VIETNAMESE AMBITIONS, TO INDUCE HANOI TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT IN KAMPUCHEA. WE ALSO REGARD NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT AS ESSENTIAL FOR MAINTAINING THE LONGER-TERM VIABILITY OF OUR STRATEGY.

-- WE FIRMLY SUPPORT THE UNGA RESOLUTION ON KAMPUCHEA AS THE BEST BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT IN KAMPUCHEA. WE JOIN THE CALL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AS A NEXT STEP TO FIND A SOLUTION.

-- WE WELCOME RALLYING OF THE KHMER TO OPPOSE THE VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION. WE ARE LOOKING AT WAYS TO INCREASE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE KHMER OPPOSING THE VIETNAMESE. WE WILL STUDY EMERGING ALLIANCES AMONG THE KHMER AND CONSULT CLOSELY WITH ASEAN AND CHINA ON HOW WE CAN BEST HELP.

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-- WE WILL NOT PRESSURE THE NON-COMMUNIST KHMER TO FORM A COALITION WITH THE DK, EXCEPT ON CONDITIONS AND TERMS WHICH ARE SATISFACTORY TO THEM. NONEHELESS, WE RECOGNIZE THE ADVANTAGES OF A MORE UNIFIED RESISTANCE.

-- WE CANNOT IGNORE THE FACT THAT OUR EFFORTS TO DEVELOP THE MAXIMUM INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE OPPOSING THE VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA ARE AFFECTED ADVERSELY BY THE RECORD OF THE POL POT LEADERSHIP. THE UNITED STATES COULD NEVER SUPPORT THE RETURN OF POL POT TO POWER. TO FACILITATE OUR COMMON EFFORTS, WE URGE CHINA TO SPREAD THE WORD OF ITS COMMITMENT TO ACCEPT ANY POLITICAL OUTCOME WHICH THE KHMER PEOPLE THEMSELVES MAY CHOOSE WITHOUT EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE.

-- WE APPLAUD PROGRESS IN NORMALIZING OF CHINA'S STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS WITH THE INDIVIDUAL STATES OF ASEAN. WE REGARD THIS AS A HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT FOR THE REGION.

THEIR OWN INFORMATION, YOU SHOULD ALSO INFORM THE VIETNAMESE THAT WE CONTINUE TO HEAR DOUBTS AMONG SOME IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, NOTABLY FROM THE INDONESIANS AND MALAYSIANS, ABOUT CHINA'S LONGER TERM INTENTIONS.

STOESSEL

END OF MESSAGE

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